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ETTA JEAN HORN, Administratrix of the
Estate of THRESSA G. JONES, Deceased,
Appellant,
No. 14161

vs
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A., a
National Banking Association, MICHAEL
PETERS, PEGGY PETERS CUNNINGHAM,
KAYLEEN JONES and JANICE JONES.
Appellees.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS,
LEONARD & TATE
Gary A. Frank
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ETTA JEAN HORN, Administratrix of the
Estate of THRESSA G. JONES, Deceased,
Appellant,
No. 14161

vs.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A., a
National Banking Association, MICHAEL
PETERS, PEGGY PETERS CUNNINGHAM,
KAYLEEN JONES and JANICE JONES,
Appellees.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant above-named, pursuant to Rule 76 (e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully petitions this
Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled matter and
alleges that in making its decision herein, this Court erred
in the following particulars:
1.

This Court erroneously failed to consider whether

the retention of the incidents of ownership by the settlor
constituted possession of a legal or equitable estate in
real property within the meaning of the distributive share
statute, Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended).
2.

This Court erroneously concluded that the settlor's

retention of all incidents of ownership was not sufficient
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to render the subject trust illusory or invalid.
3.

This Court erred in affirming the decision of the

lower court.
DATED this 5th day of May, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS,
LEONARD & TATE.

( Gary/A. Trank
Attorneys'tor Appellant
1515 Walker Bank Building
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ETTA JEAN HORN, Administratrix of the
Estate of THRESSA G. JONES, Deceased,
Appellant,
No. 14161
vs.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A. , a
National Banking Association, MICHAEL
PETERS, PEGGY PETERS CUNNINGHAM,
KAYLEEN JONES and JANICE JONES,
Appellees.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
THIS COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER
THE RETENTION OF THE INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP BY THE
SETTLOR CONSTITUTED POSSESSION OF A LEGAL OR EQUITABLE ESTATE IN REAL PROPERTY WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE STATUTE, SECTION 74-4-3,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953, AS AMENDED).
The decision of this Court erroneously concludes that
the settlor of the subject trust, Dr. Clarence T. Jones,
" * * * completely divested himself of title in the lands
in question, and there was nothing left to set apart to the
surviving widow ... . . " when the settlor executed and delivered
to the Trustee a warranty deed in and to the real property
constituting a portion of the trust corpus. Appellant would
concede the propriety of this Court's holding if the distributive share statute, Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated,
(1953, as amended), was limited in its application to real
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property, bare legal title to which was possessed by the
deceased husband during the course of the marriage. However,
the pertinent statute includes within its mandate real property in which the deceased husband possessed, " * * * legal
or equitable estates . . . " during the course of the marriage.

Accordingly, the primary issue presented by this

proceeding is not resolved by simply concluding that the
distributive share interest of a surviving spouse may be
successfully defeated by the machinations of a husband who
divests himself of bare legal title but by the same stroke
of the pen retains complete control and dominion over his
property.
The determination of this issue is separate and apart
from any consideration involving fraud or issues of whether
the settlor's conduct is so fraught with bad faith as to
render the final fruits of his efforts illusory.

Simply

put, a revocable inter vivos trust does not have to be
declared invalid because of fraud or other considerations
that would render the trust illusory, before the distributive share statute may be enforced against real property
constituting a portion of the trust res. Assuming for
the purposes of this argument that the circumstances surrounding the creation of this subject trust were not tainted
with question of fraud, conduct would render the trust
illusory or other considerations of public policy, this Court
would still be faced with the ultimate question of whether
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the retention of dominion and control by the settlor constituted possession of a legal or equitable estate in the real
property.
By its decision herein, this Court has held that an
individual may retain the right to manage and control his
property without having any legally recognizable relationship thereto.

In the past, there were four possible rela-

tionships or estates recognized in contemplation of law:
(1) The owner or holder of bare legal title such as a
seller who retains legal title for security purposes only;
(2) The owner or holder of an equitable interest which has
been broadly defined as one holding any interest that will
be legally protected, such as the rights of possession or
control; (3) The owner or holder of both legal title and
equitable estates; and, (4)

One who owns or holds neither

legal title nor equitable interest.

By its decision herein,

this Court has created a fifth estate encompassing owners
or holders of all benefits of ownership, such as the rights
to possession and sale, lease, investment, management and
all controls over the real property, which incidents of owner- .
ship are legally protectable but which, by the decision herein,
are not legally recognized to exist.

The incongruity of this

fifth estate is obvious.
Should the decision of this Court be allowed to stand,
a question arises as to whether real property transferred
to a revocable inter vivos trust wherein the settlor retains
3.
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the power to amend or revoke the trust and thereby free any
or all of the trust corpus from the terms thereof and also
control the sale, investment or management of the subject
property, is includable in the gross estate of the settlor
for inheritance tax purposes.

Section 59-12-3 Utah Code

Annotated (1953, as amended) provides, in part:
"The value of the gross estate of a
decedent shall be determined by including
the value * * * of all property, real or
personal, within the jurisdiction of this
state, and any interest therein, whether
tangible or intangible, which shall pass
to any person, in trust or otherwise, by
testamentary disposition or by law of
inheritance or succession of this or any
other state or country, or by deed, grant,
bargain, sale or gift made in contemplation of the death of the grantor, vendor
or donor, or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his
death

. . . " . • '

If, as this Court holds, ff * * * that the settlor by
his conveyance to the trustee completely divested himself
of title in the lands in question, and there was nothing
left to set apart to the surviving widow . v . ff, because
the settlor was not possessed of a legal or equitable
estate in or to the real property, appellant submits that
the settlor has relinquished any and all interest in and
to the real property and the same should not be included
in his gross estate for inheritance tax purposes.

On the

other hand, if the settlor retained sufficient interest in
the property to include the same within his gross estate,
this interest should also be sufficient to apply the
4 .
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distributive share statute.

The same interest that permits

the state to benefit through the assessment of an inheritance tax should also be sufficient to bestow the statutorily intended benefit on a surviving spouse.
A conclusion that a revocable inter vivos trust was
not tainted with fraud or other factors requiring a finding
that the same is illusory or contrary to public policy but
that the retention of the powers of ownership by the settlor
constituted possession of a legal or equitable estate in
real property during the marriage, does not require that
the entire trust be declared void or invalid.

To the

contrary, the proper relief and the relief sought by appellant herein is to either set the trust aside to the extent
of the surviving spouse's interest, or impose a constructive
trust against the real property constituting a part of the
trust corpus to the extent of the surviving spousefs statutory interest.

As stated in 42 Kentucky Law Journal, Inter

Vivos Trusts and the Election Rights of a Surviving Spouse,
616 (1954 at 631):
"III. The Newman v. Dore concept that a
transfer although valid as to all other
persons may nevertheless be invalid as
against a surviving spouse is sound, for
it recognizes the policy underlying the
election statutes.
"However, the courts should abandon the
practice of refusing to lay down precise
rules in regard to the reserved powers
sufficient to invalidate a transfer, for
it has resulted only in uncertainty and
confusion.
5-;
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"IV. It is submitted that the most satisfactory solution to this problem lies in
the adoption of a rule which declares
invalid as against a surviving spouse all
gratuitous inter vivos transfers in trust
to the extent to which a deceased spouse
retains either a power of revocation, or
amendment, or consumption of the principal
of the trust, or any combination of these
powers.
"The rule should be applied whether the
deceased spouse died intestate or testate.
The trust, if otherwise valid, however,
should not be set aside in toto, but only
to the extent required to satisfy the
survivor's forced share.
"This solution permits the one spouse to
freely alienate his property during his
lifetime and at the same time protects
the survivor from disinheritance by means
of a device which will accomplish a
result which the election statutes prevent the decedent from accomplishing
by will."
Accordingly, this Court should recognize that the
incidents of ownership reserved by the settlor in the trust
that gave rise to this proceeding constituted possession of
at least an equitable estate in the real property constituting
a portion of the trust corpus, and that the trust should either
be invalidated to the extent of the surviving spouse's interest,
or a constructive trust imposed against the real property to
the extent of the surviving spouse's interest. Anything less
contravenes both the clear wording and stated purpose of
Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
THIS COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SETTLOR'S
RETENTION OF ALL INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP WAS NOT
SUFFICIENT TO RENDER THE SUBJECT TRUST ILLUSORY OR
INVALID.

6.
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Appellant respectfully submits that a careful review
of the factual circumstances preceding and surrounding the
creation of the subject trust by Dr. Clarence T. Jones compels the conclusion that the transfer of the bare legal
title to the real property to the trustee did not include
a relinquishment of the settlor's incidents of ownership
and Dr. Jones remained the sole beneficial owner exercising
the same degree of control and dominion over the subject
property as enjoyed prior to the transfer thereof.

The

effect of creating a revocable inter vivos trust that would
merely transfer bare legal title while allowing full control
over the property was adequately explained to Dr. Jones by
a Mr. Thomas C. Cuthbert, the trust officer for respondent
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. (Exhibit 3, p. 3). There
is no clearer evidence to establish the fact that Dr. Jones
jealously protected his right to exercise unrestrained
control over the subject property than the declared statement by Dr. Jones set forth in the Lease Agreement under
date of August 1, 1961 (Exhibit 4) wherein it is acknowledged:
ff

I, Clarence T. Jones, state that I am the
beneficial owner of the premises leased herein,
and the Seller referred to in Paragraph No. 3
of this Agreement, and hereby agree to all the
terms and provisions hereof insofar as they
relate to or place any obligation upon me."
(Exhibit 4, p. 4)
Accordingly, the record herein is subject to no other
interpretation but that the settlor accepted the invitation
to transfer the bare legal title to the real property to the
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trustee while retaining the full control enjoyed by the
settlor prior to the transfer.
While appellant respectfully submits that the retention
of the incidents of ownership to this degree renders the
trust illusory, it is further submitted that this inescapable conclusion does not require that the entire trust be
totally invalidated.

Again, appellant suggests that the

proper remedy would be an invalidation of the trust to the
extent of the surviving spouse's interest or, in the alternative, the imposition of a constructive trust against the
real property constituting a portion of the trust res. with
the surviving spouse being designated, in legal effect, a
tenant in common with the trustee.

Free v. Little, et al,

31 Utah 449, 88 Pac. 407 (1907).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein stated, appellant respectfully
submits that the Petition for Rehearing should be granted.
DATED this

^

day of May, 1976.
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS,
LEONARD & TATE

J? rant

Attorneys for Appellant
1515 Walker Bank Building
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Petition
for Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof to Heber Grant
Ivins, Attorney for Appellees, 75 North Center, American
Fork, Utah 84003, this 6th day of May, 1976, by first-class
mail, postage prepaid.
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